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Enterprise Corporatism
New Industrial Policy and the "Essence" of the Legal Person
I.
The legal person has become an inert person indeed. While 
in the 19th Century it was a fiery fighter for political and 
economic freedoms against government regulation and concession 
systems, today it is no longer trusted with any role in major 
economic policy controversies. What can the legal person, of all 
persons, possibly contribute to current issues such as the "new 
industrial divide", the European choice between 
"Americanization" and "Japanization", the strategies of new 
flexibility and the "management of uncertainty" (1)? The search 
for the "essence" of the legal person, which has fascinated 
whole generations of lawyers, has now been tacitly abandoned due 
to an everyday familiarity with this legal entity. Today the 
legal person is having to pay the price of success: nobody is 
interested in its essence any longer, and, despite warnings to 
the contrary, it is no longer taken seriously, not even when the 
issue involved is the famous "piercing of the corporate veil" 




























































































To be sure, there have been some recent attempts to 
rediscover the political dimensions of the legal person (3). In 
an impressive reinterpretation, for instance, Claus Ott has 
described the old dispute over the "essence" of the legal person 
as a political conflict over the function and legitimation of 
intermediary forces in society, raising the question of its 
political legitimation under present-day conditions. But while a 
pluralist concept of corporate governance did emerge from Ott's 
analysis, it made no contribution to the theory of the legal 
person (4). And no wonder, for if Ott proposes to solve the 
corporate person's legitimation problems by establishing links 
to interest groups and regional parliaments, then the real 
achievement of the legal person - namely to increase 
organizational autonomy - has to take second place.
In order to rediscover the social dimension of the legal 
person, it would seem advisable to completely invert the 
approach adopted. It is not a limitation of organizational 
autonomy that is needed, but a heightening of it. If the 
legitimation of the firm is sought primarily not in the consent 
of those involved, but in its overall social function and 
performance (5), then the heightening of organizational autonomy 
vis-à-vis the persons and interest groups involved is not only 
compatible with this legitimation, but indeed its precondition. 
We can then start to see what the good old legal person might be 
able to contribute to industry policy. Industry policy might be 




























































































contractual flexibilization in the heightened autonomy of an 
action system which is independent vis-à-vis the groups involved 
and which is capable of reacting sensitively, in autonomous 
goal-seeking, to the demands of, threats to, and changes in the 
environment (6). To achieve such flexibilization through 
organization (7), however, it is necessary, in the interests of 
society as a whole, of course, to strengthen the "corporate 
actor" - a new-fangled term for the legal person - and its 
autonomy vis-à-vis the internal interest groups involved. This 
turns the current logic of legitimation entirely on its head. It 
is not pluralism within the firm that justifies the actions of 
the corporate actor, but the contrary: internal pluralism is 
legitimate only insofar as it is oriented towards the corporate 
actor's goals, which in turn must be legitimized by the firm's 
function and performance in society.
To give such preeminence to the collective identity of 
organizations is certainly problematic today (8). With the 
spread of economic models adhering strictly to methodological 
individualism, collective actors have fallen into disrepute. The 
firm is dissolved into a network of contracts among the 
individuals involved, or into a "transactional network" in 
which, while a "central agent" does appear as a natural person, 
the legal person either does not feature at all, or does so only 
as a bizarre fiction of jurists (9). Even sociologists, who by 
the nature of their discipline ought to develop a feeling for 




























































































out of existence by conceptualizing it as resource pooling by 
individuals (10). Those who assert the social reality of 
collective units are liable to be suspected of a 
methodologically and politically doubtful holism/collectivism.
If instead a systems-theory approach is chosen, the very 
distinction between individualism and collectivism becomes 
questionable (11). Systems theory neither reduces collective 
action to individual action nor vice versa, but interprets both 
as different forms of social attribution of action. The 
recently developed theory of self-referential systems in 
particular allows the legal person and its social reality to be 
understood without collectivist or organicist metaphors (12).
The thesis to be developed below is that the legal person is 
neither a fiction a la Savigny, nor has it as its substratum the 
"physico-spiritual unity" of Gierke's real corporate 
personality, nor is it merely an autonomized pool of resources. 
Nor has a convincing social basis for the legal person yet been 
found in the social action system, not even with formal 
organization. Instead, we would suggest that the social reality 
of a legal person is a "collectivity": the socially binding 
self-description of an organized action system as a cyclical 
linkage of identity and action.
The compactness of this definition of our thesis admittedly 
makes it obscure and therefore in need of considerable 




























































































implications for legal theory, legal doctrine and legal policy, 
which can certainly not fully be worked out in this article.
Some of the legal theory implications will be touched upon in a 
discussion of the relationship between the social reality and 
the legal regulation of the legal person (in III): What degree 
of freedom does the legal person have vis-à-vis the 
corporate actor? What is the function of legal personification 
of collectivities? The consequences of our thesis for legal 
doctrine (IV) will be treated in relation to the question of how 
the relationship between legal person and economic organization 
is to be dealt with in a legal sense. Finally, some legal policy 
implications (V) will be discussed under the heading of 
"enterprise corporatism": if a strategy of neo-corporatist
producers' coalitions is developed as an industrial policy 
alternative to contractual flexibilization, how does this 
strategy relate to the impersonal order that the corporate actor 
represents?
II.
The contemporary debate on the legal person seems content 
to accept its purely technically legal character (13), but there 
are nevertheless views that stress its dynamic social reality 
(14). The most advanced proponents of this position are 
prepared to "award Gierke the palm", as long as his "real 




























































































cleansed of collectivist and organicist metaphors. But a 
peculiar embarrassment makes itself felt when it comes to 
defining how thorough the cleansing should be. What is left, 
after this purge, of the "physico-spiritual life-unit" of 
Gierke's "real corporate personality" (15)? After Rittner's 
treatment, we still have the objective spirit: a "special 
spiritual action centre of objectivity", which makes possible 
"the supra-individual continuity of (in the broadest sense) 
cultural substances" (16). Taking a suitable distance from neo- 
idealistic formulations, Wieacker in his turn has a go at social 
psychology: then all that is left is the empirical reality of 
the legal person in "group consciousness" (17). Ott allows the 
legal person more of a political reality: as the power and 
action centre of "private government" (18). In a particularly 
thorough cleansing, finally, Flume reduces the hard reality of 
"social entities" to Savigny's "ideale Ganze" (ideal whole), the 
more detailed definition of which, however, with wise self- 
restraint, he leaves open (19). By contrast with the burgeoning 
fullness of Gierke's real corporate personality, such a cleansed 
and filleted legal entity looks rather thin. Considering the 
original grandiose concept, this present state of debate seems 
rather petty-minded. Is Jellinek's call to make the pre-legal 
reality of associations independent of organism theory (20) 
unfulfillable even today?
Gierke's cardinal error was to conceive of the components 




























































































called associations "organisms whose parts are human 
beings" (22), he programmed the errors of organicist 
collectivism. Not only does this entail difficulties for the 
treatment of institutions (Anstalten), foundations (Stiftungen) 
and one-man companies, but by taking actual men as the essential 
elements of an association, it bars access to the social reality 
of associations, for then collectivities can be seen only as 
"supermen". Methodological individualism is quite right to 
attack such mystifications of collective units as supra- 
individual entities linking separate individuals into new 
wholes. It is however quite wrong to reduce the specific 
dynamics of social processes to individual action, and 
correspondingly to see collectivities such as the legal person 
only as mere abbreviations, shorthand expressions, "verbal 
symbols", for the complex aggregates of individual actions that 
are really involved (23). The eigendynamics of the legal 
person's substratum can be better understood by viewing the 
substratum as an autonomous communicative process, with actual 
people simply being treated as part of this process' 
environment. If this step is not taken and yet the social 
reality of the legal person is nevertheless maintained, one 
falls into the trap of organicist collectivism - or else one 
escapes into neo-idealism, social psychology, or politics.
If, then, the substratum of the legal person does not 
consist of an assemblage of individuals, what is it? Is it a 




























































































sequence, a chain of transactions or a resource pool? All these 
solutions have their advocates: Max Weber saw the associational 
reality as a "relation" (24); Talcott Parsons conceived of 
"actions" or "roles" as the reality of social systems (25); 
Chester Barnard dissolved the organization into "activities" 
(26), Herbert Simon into "decision premises" (27), Oliver E. 
Williamson into "transactions" (28); James Coleman sees the 
reality of the corporate actor in "pooled resources" (29). These 
are just a few of the authorities that have done without actual 
individuals as the units of the pre-legal reality of legal 
persons. But which of these elements ought to take the place of 
actual people?
With unerring intuition, Gierke found the criterion by 
insisting on the "livingness" of the association, on its 
internal dynamics and continual self-reproduction, concomitantly 
ridiculing the theories of Zweckvermoeqen (resource pools, 
special-purpose funds) because only "organized associations of 
individuals with unitary associative will could have the 
animated body to which a genuine legal personality can be 
attributed, such as a mere purpose or a dead fund could never 
acquire" (30).
This argument of course reveals the second major error of 
organicist collectivism. Social systems are in fact not 
constituted on a basis of life as "real physico-spiritual 




























































































be taken, as does Rittner, as substances of the objective 
spirit. One size smaller will still do. It is enough for social 
systems to be constituted as communicative units on the basis of 
social meaning, which excludes in principle both biologisra and 
idealism. Nevertheless, if one abstracts from "life" and 
"meaning" in the direction of a theory of "self-reproducing 
systems", then one has found the criterion, with Gierke. The 
social substratum to be personified is not simply a (static) 
social structure. Instead, it is an eigendynamic system, with 
selections of its own, and with a capacity for self­
organization and self-reproduction. All that Gierke had 
available to express this dynamism was the misleading metaphor 
of "life". Today for this we have the cooler, remoter concept of 
an autopoietic social system: a system of actions/communications 
that reproduces itself by constantly producing from the network 
of its elements new communications/actions as elements (31). 
Therein lies the dynamic social reality of the substratum: the 
legal person is based not on a mere social relation (Weber) or 
social structure (Parsons), but on a "pulsating" sequence of 
meaningfully interrelated communicative events, that constantly 
reproduce themselves (32).
From this position we can see that the purpose theories and 
pool theories of the legal person (33), even in their more 
recent versions of the organized special-purpose fund 
(orqanisiertes Zweckvermoegen) or resource pooling (34), are 




























































































Even if we ignore the less advanced purpose theories, which 
disqualify themselves by trivially defining the "Vermoeqen" as 
things or assemblages of things, and consider only the more 
ambitious definition of Vermoeqen as a bundle of property 
rights, such theories are of only limited scope. For even then 
they apply only to a (relatively static) substructure of a whole 
dynamic system of action - Gierke's "dead fund". For this 
reason, the more recent legal theories which argue on a 
corporate actor basis are superior in principle to those which 
argue on a basis of a resource pool (35), since they at least 
aim at the personification of the whole action system, and not 
merely of the partial aspect of the property rights structure.
Ought we, then, to take a self-reproducing action system as 
the social substratum of the legal person? No; for this, too, is 
accurate only in a very provisional sense, not to say 
misleading. The term "social action system" covers a multitude 
of social phenomena, from simple conversation and the group via 
law, the economy and politics, right up to the world society, 
far from all of which have any entitlement to legal 
personification. A qualifying characteristic must be added that 
justifies giving a social system the honorary title of 
"collectivity" or "corporate actor".
The criterion which is frequently chosen for this today is 
formal organization (36). The substratum of the legal person is 




























































































certainly provides a plausible criterion, and at the same time 
covers the majority of empirical phenomena, namely formal 
organizations.
But however formal organization is defined, whether as a 
goal-oriented social system (38), a relation of bureaucratic 
domination (39), or a governance structure (40), none of these 
definitions catches the reality of the corporate actor or the 
collectivity. An organization does not become capable of action 
(in a pre-legal sense) by merely constituting itself as a goal- 
oriented system (41). Indeed, the social reality of the 
corporate actor is not located at all at the level of actual 
system operations (communications, actions, decisions). The 
emergent quality of a "corporate actor" arises from self­
description in the action system itself. It is reflexive 
communication in the action system, communication on its own 
identity and its capacity for action, that constitutes the 
corporate actor or the collectivity as a mere semantic artefact, 
as a linguistically condensed perception of group identity. But 
it is only to the extent that such a corporate actor becomes 
institutionalized, i.e., that organizational actions are 
actually oriented round this self description, that the 
corporate actor takes on social reality (42).
Looking back from here once again at the old dispute on the 
nature of corporate personality, the ambivalence of the 




























































































clear. It is neither a pure fiction nor a real corporate 
personality - or else it is both at the same time. The corporate 
actor is "fictional" because it is not identical with the real 
organization but only with the semantics of its self­
description. It is "real" because this fiction takes on 
structural effect and orients social actions by binding them 
collectively. Max Weber came closest to capturing this 
ambivalence by treating collectivities only as "ideas" in the 
heads of judges, officials and the public, while at the same 
time assigning them "a very powerful, often indeed predominant, 
causal significance for the way the action of real people 
unfolds" (43). Another who came close is Franz Wieacker, for 
whom "the socio-empirical reality of the social group types 
'association, corporation' ... lies in the group consciousness 
of the members and their partners and in the specific nature of 
the group's behaviour" (44).
To be sure, both formulated only the psychic but not the 
social reality of the collectivity. It is not unexpressed ideas 
in the heads of those involved, but communicative self­
descriptions in the organization as an action system that 
constitute the hard reality of the collectivity, the collective 
bond: "collective action is adopted as a premise in the meaning 
of other system actions, thereby limiting possibilities" (45).
An additional step further beyond Max Weber, who explicitly 




























































































in order to throw full light on the substratum of the legal 
person. For the social self-description of collective identity - 
"corporate identity" - only succeeds in conveying a half 
impression of the corporate actor. Only a first approximation of 
the collectivization of a group can be obtained from 
representing it as the institutionalization of collective 
identity, be it on the model of a human person or of an 
organism. To gain a full understanding, the collectivity must 
instead be seen as a dyadic relationship. This is, say, what 
Parsons does in construing it as a relationship between 
"solidarity" and capacity for "action in concert" (46).
The key to understanding lies in the cyclical linkage of 
action and collective identity via mechanisms of attribution. 
Even in the case of simple interaction or of the group, the 
everyday understanding of acting individuals must be re-directed 
so that events become system actions only once the communication 
network regards its participants or members as "persons", i.e., 
only once individuals are constituted as social constructs, and 
particular events are then assigned to these self-created 
communicative realities (47). Even at the level of interactions 
and groups, then, it is mechanisms of attribution that 
constitute system actions (actions of the system itself (as 
collective actor)) by contrast with environmental events 
(actions (of people) within the system). It is only by taking 
this construction seriously that one can understand the process 




























































































attribution of an action from one social construct to another, 
from a "natural" to a "legal" person. A self-description of the 
system as a whole is produced and to this construct actions are 
attributed as actions of the system. This is a self-supporting 
construction: collective actions are the product of the 
corporate actor to which events are attributed, and the 
corporate actor is nothing but the product of these actions.
A first interim result might then be as follows: the social 
substratum of the legal person is neither an assemblage of 
people nor a pool of resources nor a mere organizational 
structure. Nor is it adequately characterized as an action 
system or as formal organization. The substratum is conceived 
properly as a "collectivity" or "corporate actor", i.e., the 
self-description of a (usually formally) organized social action 
system that brings about a cyclical linkage of self- 
referentially constituted system identity and system elements.
III.
If we now know everything about the "substratum" of the 
legal person, we still know nothing about its "essence". For the 
question of "essence" changes the system reference from the 
organization to the law, bringing up the question of what room 
the legal system has for manoeuvre in its external description 




























































































freedoms can the legal person assume vis-à-vis the corporate 
actor? All freedoms and every freedom, is the answer in good 
positivist language. Even if we no longer see the substratum 
merely diffusely as a "social phenomenon", an "action centre", 
an "acting unit" and the like, but more precisely as a 
"collectivity" in the sense defined above, there still remains a 
difference in principle between the social structures and the 
legal structure of corporate personality. There are no fixed 
objective relationships between pre-legal structures and legal 
construction. There is no sociological natural law of the legal 
person. If legal positivity is to be taken seriously here, too, 
then one would on the contrary have to expect a high degree of 
variability between law and social substratum. As Selznick says: 
"...the institutional perspective is quite compatible with a 
more selective policy-oriented concept of the corporation" (48).
From the systems-theory point of view, too, the autonomy of 
the legal system in the construction of its own environment and 
in the choice of its distinctions must be stressed. This is 
external observation of a self observation: the legal system 
observes, using its own conceptualizations, how the organized 
social system observes itself as a "collectivity", or else how 
it is observed as such by its environment. The legal system is 
in no way "bound" by the self observation, nor by other (e.g. 
psychological, sociological or "life world") external 
observations of this self observation (49). There is therefore 




























































































reality of the substratum and on the other defending a 
positivist or constructivist concept of the legal person. The 
most decisive advocate of this position was perhaps Kelsen: the 
legal person is a partial legal suborder, a complex of norms 
relating to a particular legally defined entity (contract, 
corporation, association, federation, municipality, state). In 
the personification, the norm complex is nothing but a point of 
attribution (50). Kelsen's problem, however, lies in his rigid 
separation of the social and the legal spheres, the interaction 
of which is set aside by erecting a conceptual barrier.
Accordingly, nothing prevents the legal system from taking 
any object whatever - divinities, saints, temples, plots of 
land, art objects - as points of attribution and giving them 
legal capacity (51). Trees particularly are prominent 
candidates: in legal theory and legal policy discussion they are 
continually raised as potential legal subjects - quite rightly 
today ("Should trees have standing?") (52).
But it is amazing that, despite an extremely high degree of 
freedom and choice, there are nevertheless such great structural 
correspondences between "collectivity" and "legal person" (53). 
It is not only that the social and legal mechanisms of action 
attribution to constructs produced within the system 
(individual/collectivity in the social world, natural 
person/legal person in the legal world) are in principle 




























































































law today makes practically no use of its positivist freedom and 
exclusively promotes "collectivities" to the status of legal 
persons (in the sense defined above, even a one-man-company is a 
"collectivity"!). Flume has argued forcefully that it makes no 
sense to subsume the complex reality of the legal person under a 
"unitary concept": "What meaning is it supposed to have if one 
covers the reality of the state, of municipalities, of churches, 
of a corporation, of a foundation, of a sporting association 
etc. in a unitary concept?" (54). But the concept of 
“collectivity" or "corporate actor” developed above (i.e., self­
description of an organized social system as the link between 
identity and capacity for action) shows instead that it 
certainly does make sense to subsume these social phenomena 
under a unitary concept.
What are the objections to the unitary concept? Certainly 
not the fact of acting in different spheres (e.g., politics, 
economy, culture, religion, leisure). More problematic are the 
important differences that exist between associations, 
institutions and foundations. Because of these differences it is 
often believed that there can be no unitary concept of the 
substratum. For in the case of associations it can only consist 
of human beings, whereas for foundations and institutions it is 
only the resource pools that could be the real substratum (55). 
But this is precisely the point at which collectivity and the 




























































































concept of the substratum than, say, Rittner's and Flume's vague 
concepts of "action unit" and "social phenomenon" could do.
The thesis is that, without being normatively compelled to 
do so, the law regularly binds up legal capacity with a large 
set of prerequisites of a particular social reality, which can 
be described by a "unitary concept". These prerequisites are:
(1) (formally) organized action system, (2) a self-description 
of a collective identity, (3) a cyclical linkage of identity and 
action via mechanisms of attribution. And thus we return to the 
social system's unitary concept of the collectivity.
The reasons for this close correspondence between law and 
society, astonishing from the viewpoint of positivist freedoms, 
are neither of natural law nor of legal logic, but merely of 
legal policy. Giving legal capacity to social formations makes 
policy sense only when they have a highly developed internal 
order (56). Social capacity for action, i.e., the capacity for 
attributing external effects to the social system as such, 
implies that actions of certain individuals are attributed to 
all participants, socially entitling and obligating them. This 
calls for an order that has many social prerequisites: "the 
development of leadership structures, the formation of media for 
transferring selections in the system, mainly of power, the 
legitimation of representation rules and distributive processes 




























































































alleviation of personal attribution, plus provision, despite 
this, for motivation and responsibility" (57).
These requirements can be summarized in the formula "social 
capacity for collective action". As a rule, it makes legal 
policy sense to grant legal capacity to social systems that 
already have capacity for collective action. As the German 
example of the nichtrechtsfaehiger Verein (association without 
legal capacity) or the Italian example of the Mafia shows, there 
may be powerful legal policy reasons which militate against the 
granting of legal capacity to certain social systems even though 
they are effectively capable of collective action. At the same 
time, the examples of political parties and trade unions show 
that once collective capacity for action has been developed, the 
legal system is exposed to massive pressure to complete the 
social personification by legal personification.
The second reason supporting a correspondence between the 
social and legal structure lies deeper. It concerns the social 
function of legal personification. This is understood quite 
inadequately if only the advantages of limited liability are 
taken into consideration and if the disadvantages are partially 
compensated for by "piercing the corporate veil" (58). Much more 
important aspects are, for example, the saving in transaction 
costs and the coordination advantages of "resource pooling"
(59); efficiency gains deriving from the legal support of the 




























































































advantages for the organization in contacts with the environment
(61) ; or, last but not least, the well known "legal immortality"
(62) . The really interesting "emergent property" lies, however, 
in the building up of a (second order) autopoietic system (63). 
By the cyclical linkage of identity and action perfected in the 
legal person, the action system acquires a hitherto unachieved 
autonomy vis-à-vis its environment, both the external 
environment of market and politics and the internal environment 
of members and others involved in the organization. The legally 
supported personification is a decisive step towards complete 
operational closure, which at the same time means a new type of 
environmental openness, i.e., a step towards that linkage 
between closure and openness which is typical of autopoietic 
systems and is the basis of their evolutionary success (64).
This clears the way for transferring the profit motive from 
shareholders to the "Unternehmen an sich" (enterprise in and of 
itself), and would make the criteria of social responsibility 
apply not only to the personal actors, but also to the 
organization in terms of "corporate" social responsibility (65). 
The development of autopoietic autonomy thereby also opens up 
far-reaching perspectives of economic and political control. As 
Renate Mayntz recently rightly stressed, although autopoietic 
closure of formal organizations produces opaqueness and 
therefore control problems, it nevertheless also at the same 
time creates new opportunities for political and legal control 




























































































contributes to producing the "unity" of the system. It allows 
for "operational closure" of the self-referential information 
process and for "structural coupling" to the needs and interests 
of the environment.
The second interim result could be formulated as follows: 
in the sense of positivist or constructivist theories of the 
legal person, the law has great freedom as to what social 
phenomena are to be given legal capacity. Nevertheless, in 
practice there exists a great correspondence between social 
structures and legal structures of corporate personality, which 
justifies a unitary concept of the substratum as collectivity or 
corporate actor. The basis for this is the linking of legal 
capacity to the social capacity for collective action. Its 
function is the building up of a second-order autopoietic 
system, which allows a new combination of operational closure 
and environmental openness.
IV
Of what concern is all this to the practicing lawyer? A 
great deal; for, apart from consequences in legal theory, this 
view of the "essence" of the corporate personality also has 
implications for legal doctrine. If its "essence" lies not in 
resources nor in people but in the legal reconstruction of a 




























































































consequences for such exotic legal phenomena as the one-man- 
company, and the "personless corporation". The "personless 
corporation" not only becomes conceivable, but is always 
presupposed (67). But consequences then also have to be drawn 
for the legal conceptualization of corporate membership and of 
corporate bodies ("Orqane"), since in the glaring light of 
systems theory corporate members and corporate bodies evaporate 
into mere bundles of roles (68). When the issue of the disregard 
of the corporate entity is raised, the legal person is to be 
"taken seriously" in a different sense than that recently 
proposed (69). And the relationship between "unity and 
multiplicity in the group enterprise" should be re-thought in 
relation to the legal capacity for action of the group 
enterprise as a whole (70). Obviously the new "group theory" of 
German partnership law (Personengesellschaft) developed by Flume 
would require critical examination specifically as to whether 
the distinctions still affirmed in the concept of "group" 
between an association of persons and the person of the 
association can in fact be maintained (71). Here, however, we 
shall consider only one legal problem in more detail, 
specifically because it lies at the crossing point of questions 
of legal theory, legal doctrine and legal policy: the "legal 
nature" of the business enterprise, in particular the 
relationship between the enterprise and the legal person (72).
On this issue Thomas Raiser's bold sortie has assured 




























































































implications in the codetermination debate. Raiser argued that 
de lege lata the enterprise as such (as opposed to the 
association of shareholders) was increasingly developing into 
the real point of attribution for legal rules, that it was 
"pressing" for legal capacity, and that de lege ferenda the 
enterprise as such should be assigned legal capacity (73).
This thesis has been challenged on many grounds, the most 
interesting of which for our purposes here are the legal theory 
arguments which purport to refute the "suitable ideology" (74) 
from a seemingly higher standpoint. Professor Rittner teaches 
that "for logical reasons alone it is out of the question to 
declare that the enterprise itself is the 'subject' (Traeqer) of 
the enterprise" (75). Professor Flume caps this with : 
"MUENCHHAUSEN jurisprudence"! (76). That is intended to 
discourage pursuit of the idea. Yet one's ears prick up when 
both scholars thereupon themselves start operating in the 
immediate vicinity of Muenchhausen. In the case of the stock 
corporation (Aktienqesellschaft), Flume "identifies" (!) the 
enterprise with the legal person "because it belongs (!) to it" 
(77). Can something belong to itself? Rittner too builds a self- 
referential construction whose compatibility with the 
presupposed logic would require some checking, when he maintains 
that the "enterprise in the broader sense" is the representative 
of the "enterprise in the narrower sense". Furthermore in the 
area of overlap between the "narrower" and "broader" enterprise 




























































































namely he declares "the enterprise to be the representative of 
the enterprise".
It is striking how many arguments for and against 
Muenchhausen accumulate around the topic of the legal person. 
There is the time-honoured argument that the fiction theory is 
false because the State itself, as a legal person, would then 
have to be a fiction, whereas the State could not, like 
Muenchhausen, have erected itself by mere motion into a legal 
fiction (78). Then, by contrast with Flume who angrily rejects 
this argument as speculation, Hofstadter of Goedel-Escher-Bach 
would joyfully welcome it: "Reflexivity of law"! (79). We also 
find that Kelsen's concept of legal person as legal suborder and 
point of attribution has been objected to on the grounds that 
the statement that the legal suborder is itself a bearer of 
norms is a tautology: the construction would have to support 
itself, "like the late Baron Muenchhausen" (80). And in this 
same context we are even confronted with the attempt of German 
corporation law to circumvent Muenchhausen by making the 
enterprise have a "subject" (Traeqer) different from itself, 
namely the legal person, which in turn is supposed to have a 
substratum different from itself, namely the association of 
persons or the resource pool (81). Obviously this is an attempt 
to avoid such tautologies and circular arguments as that the 





























































































But perhaps the mendacious Baron was not so wrong after 
all? Perhaps there really are, in the area of the legal person, 
circular relationships. May not the legal person's function 
indeed consist in making self-reference possible and in 
increasing self-reference still further in the interest of 
organizational autonomy? This, at any rate is what the theory of 
self-referential systems, which has been successfully applied in 
such varied fields as logic, computer science, neurophysiology, 
sociology, business organization and legal theory (82) and is 
here being applied to the theory of the legal person, would 
suggest.
This prompts the following two theses: (1) the traditional 
demarcations between the enterprise, the legal person and its 
substratum are to be interpreted as attempts to avoid self- 
referentiality in corporation law. Under this smokescreen, 
however, self-referentiality was actually able to make its way 
into the reality of the enterprise. (2) If the taboo of self- 
referential circularity is broken, the view opens up on to a 
self-supporting construction: the "subject" (Traeger) of the 
enterprise is the collectivity, constituted as legal person; 
the "substratum" of the legal person is the enterprise 
personified as collectivity (83).
This formulation of a strictly circular relationship 
between the enterprise and the legal person seems tautological, 




























































































expropriation (84). But before condemning it out of hand, one 
ought to examine the formulation very closely, bearing in mind 
that in a systems-theory formulation both concepts - enterprise 
and legal person - are related to a third, that of the 
collectivity. They thus go through a change in meaning, able to 
transform the tautology into impure self-reference, the 
illegality into defensible alternative interpretation and the 
expropriation into legitimate state interference 
(Sozialbindung).
Let us clarify this against the two most advanced positions 
(Raiser and Flume). Raiser's definition of both terms - 
enterprise and legal person - is still too person-related and 
insufficiently systemic. While he does manage, as he himself 
rightly comments (85), to reach a higher stage of scholarly 
reflection using the organization sociology approach (mainly 
Talcott Parsons and Renate Mayntz) to expose the enterprise as 
an organized system of actions, he nevertheless frequently 
falls back on the current stage of formulations in the course of 
analysis. Thus, for instance, he argues that "as the aggregate 
of its members", the enterprise is also a "stock of material and 
personal resources" (86). He thereby plays away the advantages 
of the systems-theory conception of the firm, according to 
which members and material resources constitute environment.
When he goes on to see the workers as members of the 




























































































to postulate the legal personification of the enterprise only de 
lege ferenda.
On the other hand Raiser also conceives of the legal person 
too personalistically. He stresses its associational character 
and thereby "internalizes" the shareholders into the legal 
person. The association of shareholders thereby implicitly 
becomes the legal person, while the other subassociations, that 
of the workers and that of the managers, as well as the 
enterprise as the overall association that incorporates these 
subassociations, are (still) denied the privilege of legal 
personification. This corresponds to current conceptions whereby 
the company of shareholders as a legal person is the subject of 
the enterprise; but it nevertheless leads to group-specific 
asymmetries which do not at all originate in the legal person - 
even, indeed, in Savigny's classical conception. If the legal 
person is bound up to that extent with the group of 
shareholders, and no clear division of spheres is made between 
legal person and members (88), then here too all one can do is 
call for changes de lege ferenda.
With two bold conceptual steps, Flume has overtaken Raiser 
and managed in the outcome to identify the enterprise, already 
de lege lata, with the legal person, at any rate for the case of 
the stock corporation. In all rigour, he brings about the 
separation, already begun in Savigny, between the sphere of the 




























































































disqualifies the identification of the shareholders' association 
with the legal person as the famous major error that "identifies 
the totality of current members with the corporation itself"
(90) . The sphere of the "ideal whole", as it were hovering free, 
can then be iinked with the enterprise whereby "both the 
enterprise with everything belonging to it, those working in it, 
the assets and liabilities and the members of the legal person"
(91) are brought together as integral components of the "ideal 
whole" of the legal person. Flume thereby goes a considerable 
step beyond Raiser. The latter, in strict obedience to lex lata, 
declares the firm to have legal competence only insofar as rules 
of law in force positivize the enterprise explicitly as a point 
of attribution and sees the enterprise's full legal capacity as 
a task de lege ferenda. Flume, by contrast, takes a cavalier 
attitude towards the law and already identifies the enterprise 
with the legal person under the prevailing state of the law.
Yet for all the boldness of the construction, even Flume 
has still not gone far enough. He limits the identification 
explicitly to the stock corporation, remaining remarkably 
ambivalent as regards the limited liability company 
(Gesellschaft mit beschraenkter Haftunq) (92). He understands it 
substantively as a kind of partnership (Personenqesellschaft) 
which is however autonomized as a legal person by virtue of its 
limited liability limitation alone. But he sees at the same 
time that this is untenable for the "big" limited company. He 




























































































legal form of the stock corporation compulsory in these cases 
(93). There is a similar ambivalence about Flume's sharp 
distinction between corporations (Kapitalqesellschaften), where 
legal person and enterprise are supposed to be identical, and 
partnerships (Personenqesellschaften), where the old notion that 
the partners are the "subjects" of the firm is supposed to 
remain. Whether, without internal splits, it is possible on the 
one hand to transform the partnership into a quasi-collectivity, 
with the "group" as the "action centre", and on the other to 
make a fundamental distinction between "group" and legal person 
in their relationship to the enterprise, seems at least 
questionable.
The second objection is that Flume, although he 
consistently separates the sphere of the "ideal whole" from that 
of the members, ultimately is not consistent enough to define 
the human individuals as the environment of the spheres of 
enterprise and legal person, but instead includes both the 
members (i.e., shareholders) and those working in the firm 
(i.e., management and employees) in the concept of the 
enterprise and that of the legal person (94). This means that he 
inevitably gets bogged down again in a misconceived debate that 
links the relationship between legal person and enterprise with 
the membership question, i.e., the question whether only 
shareholders are members of the enterprise, or also managers and 




























































































That this debate is misconceived can be demonstrated on the 
basis of the third objection to Flume's theory. Flume falls for 
the current conceptual model which allows as the reference point 
for the legal person only the alternative between the 
shareholders' association or the enterprise. What has legal 
capacity, according to this model, is either the association 
comprising only the shareholders, or else the whole enterprise, 
including shareholders, management and others involved. Tertium 
non datur? Here the circuit to the systems-theory concepts 
developed above is closed, and at the same time it becomes clear 
that for all the "technical" legal understanding, the question 
of the substratum cannot be foisted off on to sociology. Neither 
the shareholders' association nor the enterprise as a whole are 
identifiable with the legal person, but only the above defined 
corporate actor or the collectivity.
The point that, due to the clear separation of spheres, the 
association of shareholders and the legal person are not 
identical has been made adequately clear by Flume himself. Their 
spheres of action overlap only as regards the actions of 
corporate bodies. But to make the whole enterprise into the 
legal person instead , as Flume does, is to go far too far. For 
what acts as the "centre of action" is not the whole action 
system of the enterprise, but only the subcomplex which above we 
called "collectivity". Legal capacity is given only to the 
extent that collective action is involved. All that is affected 




























































































attributed to the system as a whole in collective linkage. The 
legal person covers not the whole action system of the 
enterprise, but only the subset of action called collectivity,
i.e. only those actions covered by the attribution mechanisms of 
corporation law, agency law, and labour law. It may sound 
unusual to name these phenomena in one breath, but they have 
function in common: they transform individual action (of 
"members" or "workers") iji the system into collective action by 
the system.
This makes clear why the problem of the legal person vis-à- 
vis the enterprise is not to be bound up with the membership 
question, as keeps on happening. Put rather crudely: not 
the scope of the membership but the scope of the corporate 
organs (Orqane) decides what actions belong to the legal person. 
Or as Rittner so prettily puts it, the corporate organs (Orqane) 
are "parts of the legal person itself, through which alone the 
latter can come to life " (95). It is important, however, not to 
forget the other two attribution mechanisms (agency law and 
labour law). The transformation processes that are decisive for 
the action area of the legal person accordingly take place not 
in the area of membership (expropriation!), but within the 
attribution mechanisms for collective action.
Both factual and legal transformations play a part here, as 
do private law-making and governmental regulation. The action 




























































































installation of new corporate bodies in the firm, particularly 
newly set up consultative councils, committees, etc., through 
which environments of the firm are co-opted (96). It likewise 
changes through the creation or alteration of corporate bodies 
by governmental regulation (corporate governance and 
codetermination). But factual transformation processes within 
the firm, notably decentralization, divisionalization and 
functional democratization, also change the action area of the 
legal person. The attribution mechanisms are changed: 
hierarchical attribution to the top of the organization gives 
place to an attribution to the action of autonomous decision­
making centres within the firm based on its executive bodies 
(divisions, profit centres, autonomous working groups, quality 
circles).
A further interim result might, thus, be added to the 
differentiation between enterprise and collectivity: it is an 
error to identify the legal person with the association of 
shareholders. Even de lege lata - Raiser would have to be re­
formulated - the enterprise personified as collectivity has 
legal capacity, and for all enterprises with legal capacity - 
Flume would have to be re-formulated - the legal person is 






























































































A new "suitable ideology"? It has already been claimed 
about theories of the enterprise as a "social association"
(Sozialverbandstheorien) that they were created in order to 
provide ideological support for codetermination (97). The 
"Unternehmen an sich", enterprise in and of itself, too, is 
supposed to have been only an ideology aimed at helping 
managerial capitalism over the hurdles against financial 
capitalism, in legal terms (98). This obviously prompts the 
search for political economic interests being pursued in a 
systems theory of the firm. Well then, if it must be: the sys­
temic approach formally takes its distance from the models of 
financial, managerial, labour and state capitalism. At most it 
could be said that it is pursuing the interests of an 
organizational capitalism. Or rather more seriously, a systems 
theory of the firm as a self reproducing social system may 
suggest a legal policy of "enterprise corporatism".
This cautious formulation should ward off too much 
"dietrologia" in advance. It would be rather unreasonable to 
maintain that neo-corporatism is the political consequence of 
systems theory (99). For there are many versions of systems 
theory, as it were "emancipatory", "technocratic" and 
"evolutionary" versions. And the systems theory analyses of 
enterprise, collectivity and legal person attempted above still 
claim to be correct even if enterprise corporatism should prove 




























































































All the same, there is a link between systems-theory 
analyses and legal policy recommendations, albeit a much looser 
one than the suspicion of a "suitable ideology" supposes. On the 
one hand a theoretical apparatus always perceives reality only 
selectively (for instance a systems theoretician sees only 
elements, structures and processes, where other observers see 
flesh-and-blood individuals acting) and correspondingly makes 
legal policy recommendations directed only to this selected 
reality. Secondly, systems theory asserts quite specific 
evolutionary trends which only once formulated can one think of 
influencing through legal policy intervention. In economic 
enterprises a trend can be observed to the autonomization of an 
impersonal economic complex of action, consisting of the 
differentiation of the corporate actor, with a sharp demarcation 
between those involved internally and externally. This trend is 
perceived as collectivization of an autopoietic social system. 
One may seek to combat this trend in legal policy through such 
concepts as shareholders' democracy, codetermination or 
government participation, or else one may see the autonomization 
of the organization as a promising development in the interest 
of society as a whole in guaranteeing need satisfaction for the 
future, following a direction that the law can to some extent 
help to influence (100). The name for that direction is 
enterprise corporatism.
Neo-corporatist strategies are not in vogue at present. On 




























































































increased pressure of competition and weakening or collapse of 
governmental regulatory systems, industrial strategies are being 
pursued for which neo-corporatist arrangements appear rigid, 
centralist and immobile (101). The new slogan is 
decentralization and flexibilization through contractual 
arrangements, and this applies also to methods of finance, 
technologies, product range, customer relations and labour 
relations (102). The aim of recent industrial policy is 
flexibility as a value in itself: "a general capacity of 
enterprises to reorganize in close response to fluctuations in 
their environment" (103).
While flexibility through contract is the prevailing demand 
at the moment, there is also an alternative being put forward in 
the heated debate on "Americanization" or "Japanization" of the 
European economy: flexibility through organization (104). Its 
defenders can point out that flexibility can be brought about 
not only through contractual arrangements but also through 
decentralization of organization, and that a,policy based on 
organization can additionally use the productivity advantages of 
a "producers’ coalition" (capital, management, labour,
State), which in the conditions of the new industrial divide are 
becoming increasingly necessary.
This industrial policy position is close to the ideas 
developed here. In fact, to privilege one group, whether 




























































































contractual arrangements would be bound to be suboptimal in the 
organizational interest of the corporate actor. Certainly, the 
advantage of contractual arrangements lies in the speed of 
reactions with which action systems can be built up and 
demolished in the short term, in accordance with the 
fluctuations of environmental pressures. The drawback, however, 
is that contractual solutions cannot exhaust the "organizational 
surplus value" (105). "Organizational surplus value" arises (1) 
through the building up of long-term cooperative arrangements 
which would be continually destroyed by contractual flexibility;
(2) through the diffuseness of "commitments" in the organization 
which by comparison with rigid, sharply defined contractual 
obligations produce more situational flexibility; and finally
(3) in the orientation towards the organization's interest, 
which provides stronger orientation than mere linkage to a 
contractual purpose.
This suggests a law of corporate governance based on a 
microcorporatist producers' coalition. According to this none of 
the resource providers, neither the factor of capital, nor that 
of labour, nor that of management, nor indeed the factor of 
state control, has any natural claim to "sovereignty over the 
association". In principle the connection between resource 
provision and control rights is loosened, and all control rights 
over all resources are assigned to the corporate actor as such. 
The idea of "organizationally bound property rights" (106) is 




























































































mere "contractual network". The distribution of control rights 
within the firm is then made neither according to the primacy of 
one resource interest nor according to exchange logic in a 
contractual network, but according to efficiency considerations 
oriented towards the interest of the "corporate actor", which is 
different from all of the participating interests.
Even if the external integration effects and internal 
motivation effects of microcorporatist arrangements are 
recognized, still the external disadvantages of producers' 
coalitions have to be pointed out, especially the fact that they 
may arrive at their agreements at the expense of third parties 
and even of the public interest (107). Here is the real weak 
point of enterprise neo-corporatism in the sense of a producers' 
coalition. However, the "corporate actor", the existence of 
which is asserted against all methodological individualism, 
steps in to set the legal policy direction. Efforts should 
concentrate on the institutional strengthening of the corporate 
actor, the autonomization of an impersonal complex of action 
which imposes effective constraints on action upon the 
individual interests involved, in the interest of the 
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